

TOP SECRET

CONSIDERATIONS ON A SEPARATE AGREEMENT BANNING WEAPONS
OF MASS DESTRUCTION IN SPACE

Arguments Pro:

1. The USSR is unlikely to accept such a proposal, but the US record of willingness to make such an agreement would bring favorable world reactions.
2. It is easier to prevent armament of space than to get agreement to subsequent disarmament after the arms race had been extended to outer space. An agreement along the lines proposed by the US could make a positive contribution to the national security in that it would lend impetus to the whole disarmament field, and would help curb the arms race in an area of potential military significance and reduce the threat of technological surprise in an area where the Soviet Union, by virtue of its greater payload capabilities, enjoys present advantage.
3. Since the US has committed itself to examining such a proposal, reversal of our position would raise doubts as to the sincerity of US public statements and disarmament positions, and perhaps adversely affect other political interest as well.
4. If we do not take the initiative in a form, place, and at an early time of our own choosing, the Soviets or some other country may advance a proposal including a ban on reconnaissance, perhaps in the UN General Assembly. This would be distinctly disadvantageous in terms of the support we could rally to our position.
5. Reconnaissance vehicles would not be included in the ban, and such further compromise of secrecy of our reconnaissance program as might result from Soviet claims that inspection for nuclear weapons revealed presumptive evidence of reconnaissance would be largely offset by their very acceptance of an agreement which did not ban reconnaissance.
6. The Soviet disarmament proposal itself provides for a ban on weapons in orbit and does not include a ban on reconnaissance. Consequently, we are on good ground for opposing Soviet arguments for adding reconnaissance and for countering their efforts to place on us the blame for failure to reach an agreement, if that should be their tactic.
7. Agreement on such a measure would create a political context in which Soviet hostile countermeasures would be more politically costly to them, even though advance notification might assist hostile countermeasures.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

- 2 -

Arguments Con:

1. The USSR would use the occasion of debate on such a ban to attack reconnaissance satellites, and might try to blame failure of agreement on US refusal to include a ban on reconnaissance.
2. The Soviets might decide it was important enough to them to stop our reconnaissance program actually to agree to an inspected ban on weapons plus reconnaissance uses of outer space. In such a case, if the US refused to agree we would be virtually alone in defending our stand; if we agreed, we would give up the whole key reconnaissance satellite program.
3. If the USSR agreed to our proposal for a ban on nuclear weapons in orbit, excluding reconnaissance, they would learn much about our reconnaissance operations (even though the degree of inspection would not provide details such as the resolution of the photography), and would be aided in physical active and passive countermeasures by advance notification of launchings.
4. Even an inspected ban on weapons of mass destruction in space would not provide substantial protection. At most it would provide prompt knowledge of the launching of uninspected vehicles of large size suitable for multi-megaton warheads in space. It would not give high probability of knowledge of the launching of smaller warheads, nor would it prevent any launchings for which notification had not been given.
5. Finally, previous commitments to a policy which could seriously affect our security should not be taken as requirement further to commit ourselves. The US should be able to withdraw from its commitment to negotiate a separate measure on space weapons without grave damage to the US disarmament position, if properly handled.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED when blank. TOP SECRET when filled in. This form is attached from controlled document. Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP66R00638R000100140015-2

CONTROL AND COVER SHEET FOR TOP SECRET DOCUMENT

DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION				REGISTRY			
SOURCE Dept of State				CIA CONTROL NO. 185352			
DOC. NO.				DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED 11 July 62			
DOC. DATE no date				LOGGED BY [REDACTED]			
COPY NO. thermo #8				25X1A9a			
NUMBER OF PAGES 14							
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS none							

ATTENTION: This form will be placed on top of and attached to each Top Secret document received by the Central Intelligence Agency or classified Top Secret within the CIA and will remain attached to the document until such time as it is downgraded, destroyed, or transmitted outside of CIA. Access to Top Secret matter is limited to Top Secret Control personnel and those individuals whose official duties relate to the matter. Top Secret Control Officers who receive and/or release the attached Top Secret material will sign this form and indicate period of custody in the left-hand columns provided. Each individual who sees the Top Secret document will sign and indicate the date of handling in the right-hand columns.

REFERRED TO	RECEIVED				RELEASED		SEEN BY		
OFFICE	SIGNATURE	DATE	TIME	DATE	TIME	SIGNATURE	OFFICE/DIV.	DATE	
ER	[REDACTED]	11 July 62		11 July 62					
DD/R	[REDACTED]	7/11/62				25X1A9a			
RB-588	[REDACTED]								
OSA	[REDACTED]								
							25X1A9a		
DD/B	[REDACTED]								
ER	[REDACTED]	8/7/62		8/21/62					
DDCI	[REDACTED]	8/21/62		8/28/62					
ER	[REDACTED]	8/23/62		8/23/62					
DD/R	[REDACTED]	9/4/62							

NOTICE OF DETACHMENT: When this form is detached from Top Secret material it shall be completed in the appropriate spaces below and transmitted to Central Top Secret Control for record.

DOWNGRADED		DESTROYED		DISPATCHED (OUTSIDE CIA)	
TO		BY (Signature)		TO	
BY (Signature)		WITNESSED BY (Signature)		BY (Signature)	
OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE	OFFICE	DATE

FORM 26 PREVIOUS EDITIONS.

TOP SECRET

(40)

Approved For Release 2000/08/28 : CIA-RDP66R00638R000100140015-2